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ABSTRACT This paper investigates factors shaping the dynamics of housing 
affordability in Australia over the period 2001-06. Panel model findings indicate that 
those with children and unwaged are more prone to persistent housing affordability 
stress. However, residential moves during spells of housing affordability stress alleviate 
housing cost burdens. Survival in affordable housing has become progressively more 
difficult over the 2001-06 timeframe, an unsurprising finding given a house price boom 
over the period of analysis. Residential moves are again influential, but those made by 
households during a spell in affordable housing are associated with the onset of housing 
affordability stress.  
 
KEY WORDS: Housing affordability dynamics, housing 
affordability stress  
 
JEL Classification: R20  
 
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLE: This paper utilises panel models to investigate 
factors shaping movements into and out of housing affordability stress in Australia 
over the period 2001-06.  
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the dynamics of housing affordability in Australia over the 
period 2001-06. Long-run trends indicate that housing affordability in Australia has been 
deteriorating over the last two decades. For example, the number of owner purchasers in 
housing affordability stress (HAS) - those whose net housing costs exceed 30% of gross 
household income - more than doubled from 168000 to 368000 households between 1982 
and 2002. This represents an increase in the incidence of HAS from 10% to 15% of all 
owner purchaser households. Similarly, the number of private renters in HAS almost 
doubled over the period from 1982 to 2002, though the incidence of HAS remained 
relatively constant at 20% of private renters.1 Given the long-run decline in housing 
affordability in Australia and the recent sharp increases in house prices and rents, housing 
affordability has become a key policy concern.  
There are two main forms of housing assistance policies in Australia, both of 
which are targeted at renters. Public housing is subsidised housing that has typically been 
managed by state and territory housing authorities. Public housing is offered to eligible 
tenants at below-market rents and so the numbers applying for public housing exceed the 
available housing stock. It must therefore be rationed; state and territory housing 
authorities operate wait lists to prioritise access to public housing. Tenants pay income-
related rents that are typically 25% of their assessable income, and their rents are capped 
at the estimated market rent of the property. In 2010, approximately 90% of public 
housing tenants were paying less than market rent (Steering Committee for the Review of 
Government Service Provision 2011). Historically Australian public housing tenants have 
had security of tenure so transitions in and out of Housing Affordability Stress have not 
affected continued residency in the tenure. 
                                                     
1 Authors’ own calculations using the 1982 and 2002 Surveys of Income and Housing Costs. 
Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) is a cash supplement provided by the 
Commonwealth government to private renter households who receive pensions, 
allowances or family payments. Specifically, private renter households without children 
have to receive a pension or allowance to be eligible for CRA; those with children have to 
receive more than a base rate of Family Tax Benefit Part A to be eligible. CRA is paid at 
a rate of 75 cents per dollar of rent above a specified minimum rent threshold until the 
maximum rate is reached. The minimum and maximum rent thresholds differ by 
household type, including whether the household comprises a single adult or couple, and 
number of children. CRA is not separately income tested and is only withdrawn when 
entitlement to pensions, allowances or family payments is lost. These arrangements mean 
that CRA is not particularly well targeted on tenants in HAS. The working poor who 
experience abrupt increases in rents that push them into HAS are particularly poorly 
served by CRA (see Forbes, Gibb and Wood, 2005).There exists a plethora of studies 
investigating the incidence of housing affordability and its trends through time using 
repeated cross-sectional data (see, for example, Green, 1996; Quigley and Raphael, 
2004). However, there have been few studies examining whether individuals’ housing 
affordability problems are transient or persistent (however, see Nordvik and Ahren 2005). 
This is a key question for policy-makers because the optimal policy responses appropriate 
for transient spells in HAS could well differ from those optimal when spells are expected 
to be persistent. More protracted spells could be symptomatic of housing market failures 
and entrenched disadvantage that warrant a more vigorous and long-lasting government 
response. 
We exploit the longitudinal nature of waves 1 to 6 of the Household Income and 
Labour Dynamics (HILDA) Survey data to explore research questions on the dynamics of 
housing affordability. A person-period dataset is designed that contains the records of 
those Australians at risk of exiting (un-) affordable housing. The persistence of (un-) 
affordable housing circumstances is analysed by computing hazard and survival rates 
over first spells of residence in (un-) affordable housing. The socio-economic and 
demographic factors determining the chances of escape from unaffordable housing, or 
survival in affordable housing, are investigated by estimating discrete time proportional 
odds hazard models. 
First, we investigate whether HAS has increased over the period 2001-06, and 
whether there are differences by socio-demographic characteristics such as tenure, 
geography, household type and age etc. Second, we examine whether HAS is transient or 
persistent, that is, do those who escape HAS successfully stay out of HAS, and do those 
who fall  into HAS remain in or shed this affordability status in subsequent years? To 
address this question of persistence, we adopt a hazard rate approach. Third, we employ 
panel models to estimate the impacts of socio-demographic characteristics on the 
probability of escape from a spell of HAS given HAS in the previous year, and the 
probability of falling out of a spell of affordable housing given affordable housing costs 
in the previous year. An important caveat is that this study focuses only on first spells of 
HAS (and first spells in affordable housing), that is, it ignores churning in and out of 
HAS.  
We begin in section 2 by presenting an overview of the existing Australian and 
overseas literature on the dynamics of housing affordability. In section 3, we describe the 
sample design, the extent of attrition in our sample and its potential impacts on the 
accuracy of our findings. We also describe the measurement of housing costs net of 
housing assistance entitlements, income, and  the housing affordability ratio (HAR) 
measures of housing cost burdens. Section 4 offers some descriptive statistics while 
section 5 presents results from discrete time hazard models that uncover key factors 
influencing the chances of escape from HAS, or survival in affordable housing. Section 6 
concludes by summarising the key findings and directions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There has been a plethora of studies investigating the incidence of housing 
affordability and its trends through time using repeated cross-sectional data. Overseas 
examples include Green (1996), a study that measured housing affordability in the United 
States using the 1980 and 1990 Census, and Quigley and Raphael (2004) using data from 
the American Community Survey to investigate trends in housing affordability over the 
period 1960-2000. In Australia, Yates and Gabriel (2006) employed the Survey of Income 
and Housing Costs (SIHC) to examine changes in housing affordability over the period 
1995-2003, while Wood, Watson and Flatau (2006) and Dalton and Ong (2007) have 
used the SIHC to investigate the impacts of alternative policy reforms on housing 
affordability outcomes. These studies typically find that larger households, sole parents, 
the unwaged, those with low earnings and members of ethnic minorities are particularly 
prone to HAS. 
However, there have been few studies examining whether individuals’ housing 
affordability problems are transient or persistent. In Australia this has been primarily due 
to the lack of longitudinal data that allows researchers to track the housing affordability of 
a panel of individuals through time. In some countries  longitudinal data sets have been  
available for many years; but longitudinal research by housing researchers has typically 
focused on residential mobility, housing careers, and how tenure transitions are 
intertwined with phases in the life course. Examples from the United States include 
Pickles and Davies (1985; 1986) and Clark, Deurloo and Dieleman (2003) using the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics. Studies from the United Kingdom include Andrew and Meen 
(2003) and Andrew (2004) using the British Household Panel Survey. 
The longitudinal HILDA Survey allows researchers to explore the issue of 
persistence in Australia. In recent years two studies have investigated issues relating to 
both the incidence and persistence of HAS using the HILDA Survey. Marks and 
Sedgwick (2008) is an Australian study that examined the incidence and persistence of 
HAS over the period 2001-06. To calculate the incidence of HAS, the study presented 
estimates of HAS (housing costs in excess of 30% of gross household income) in each of 
the years after the first experience of HAS. The study found that the incidence of HAS 
increased marginally in the total sample over the period of analysis, but more so for 
owners, with a discernible jump in stress between 2005 and 2006. The study reported the 
surprising finding that HAS has actually fallen among households in the lowest income 
decile (defined using equivalised disposable income), and increased in the higher income 
quartiles. It was suggested that mortgage equity withdrawal might be partly responsible 
among higher income owners. The study assessed the persistence of HAS by estimating 
the percentage of individuals in HAS in a particular year who are also in HAS one or 
several years later. Among those in HAS in 2001, less than half were in HAS in 2002, 
approximately 40% in 2003 and down to 35% in 2006. HAS was found to persist longer 
among renters.  
Using data from the 2002-03 SIHC, Yates and Gabriel’s (2006) study showed 
that, of the 7.6 million households in Australia, 1.2 million or 15.8% were in HAS (paid 
30% or more of gross household income in meeting their housing costs) in 2002-03. 
Analysis of the persistence of HAS used a balanced panel from the HILDA Survey waves 
1-3. The study found that one-half of Australians in HAS in a particular year would still 
be in HAS in the following year. Furthermore, there is a 29% chance that Australians in 
HAS in a particular year would remain in HAS continuously for three years.. The study 
concluded, contrary to Marks and Sedgwick (2008), that HAS was a protracted rather 
than transient problem.  
Engeland, Figueroa, Rea and Yuen (2008) used a balanced panel from the Survey 
of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) to investigate housing affordability dynamics in 
Canada over the period 2002-04. They reported that 28% of Canadians were in HAS 
(paid 30% or more of gross household income in meeting their housing costs) at some 
point between 2002 and 2004. Almost one third were in HAS  in all three years, an 
estimate that is similar to the Australian findings in Yates and Gabriel (2006). The 
Canadian study goes beyond the descriptive analyses of the two Australian studies by 
estimating regression models to uncover the statistical relationship between varying 
socio-economic characteristics and the probability of being observed in HAS. Their first 
regression model estimated the probability that a Canadian would be in HAS in at least 
one year of the study period; the second model targeted the issue of persistence by 
estimating the probability that a Canadian would be in HAS in all three years of the study 
period. Individuals living alone, female sole parents, renters, immigrants and residents of 
Vancouver or Toronto were estimated to have a higher probability of being in HAS at 
some point, or persistently during the three-year period. Individuals who had experienced 
a change in household structure, moved into another place of residence or another tenure 
also had a higher probability of being in HAS at one time or another during 2002-04.  
This paper attempts to extend the study of housing affordability dynamics in 
Australia by modelling the key factors that are associated with movements into and out of 
HAS. We begin by describing our sample design and the measurement of key variables. 
 
3. Sample and Measurement Issues2 
Sample Design – the Attribution Approach  
The sample has been designed using the attribution approach – in the present context this 
means that we track the housing affordability position of adult persons, but measure their 
housing affordability position on an income unit basis.3 At the start of the data collection 
                                                     
2 Additional details can be obtained from Wood and Ong (2009). 
3 An income unit comprises one or more persons whose command over income is shared between the 
people comprising the unit (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1997). Income sharing is assumed to take 
period - wave 1(2001) – there were 12612 responding independent adults in HILDA that 
could be tracked through to wave 6 (2006). To illustrate the measurement approach, consider 
an income unit made up of the couple John and Kate who had a 6-year old daughter Carol and 
were home purchasers in wave 1. The daughter is not an adult and is not therefore included in 
the sample frame. But both John and Kate are included in the sample frame. Their housing 
affordability position is calculated by measuring their combined income, and calculating 
mortgage repayments as a percentage of their combined income (the HAR). Both John and 
Kate enter the sample and each has the same HAR. If John and Kate were to divorce in wave 
4 the attribution approach retains both of them in the sample, but because they now form 
separate income units they will no longer share the same housing affordability measure. 
When John or Kate form an income unit with another adult (not present in the wave 1 
sample), that adult is not added to the sample, but their income is included for the purposes of 
calculating housing affordability. The sample for analysis is then persons, and the rate of 
say HAS is the percentage of all persons with HARs in excess of 30%, but the income 
unit (that the person belongs to) is the unit of measurement.  
There are 1136 dependent persons in wave 1 who subsequently become 
independent. There are 719 independents that stay in the household they previously 
occupied as a dependent. They are added to the sample frame from the wave/year in 
which they become an independent income unit; because they are an income unit their 
housing affordability position is calculated separately from that of the other income 
unit(s) that occupies the same household.4 There are 417 independents that move out and 
form a separate household on achieving independence. Once again, these independents 
are added to the sample from the wave/year that independence is attained.5  
                                                                                                                                                        
place among couples, and between parents and dependents. The income unit is chosen as the unit of 
housing affordability measurement here because important variables that affect housing affordability, 
such as Commonwealth Rent Assistance and Family Tax Benefit, are measured on an income unit 
basis. Most households in 2006 (87%) contain only one income unit.   
4 In practice these independent income units are adult sons and daughters living ‘rent free’ with their parents.  
5 There is a small number (106) that achieves independence, but then return to their dependent status 
before the end of the study period. This churning complicates sample design and increases data 
There are a couple of groups that have been included in the sample design who 
warrant discussion because similar studies have decided to omit them. Persons with zero 
housing costs are included, though the wage discounts of those living in employer 
provided housing have been estimated and included as a housing cost in housing 
affordability measures (see Wood and Ong, 2009, pp. 15-16). Persons residing in group 
households, that is, dwellings occupied by two or more unrelated income units, are 
included. Their exclusion can be justified on the grounds that rent must be apportioned 
using arbitrary criteria. On the other hand, group sharing is a potentially important way 
singles can economise on housing costs and so deserve attention.  
We omit persons belonging to income units with zero or negative disposable 
incomes because such outcomes are typically the result of tax minimization strategies, or 
temporary losses from self-employment that disguise underlying financial positions. 
Residents of non-private dwellings and boarders are not included because housing costs 
are not recorded. The homeless are a typical and important omission. 
Table 1 describes the sample design. There are 13748 persons who were either 
responding adults in wave 1 or who were dependents in wave 1 but became independents 
in subsequent waves. The exclusion of boarders and others where tenure cannot be 
identified; ‘churning’ dependents; and income units with zero or negative incomes leaves 




Attrition and Missing Values  
Of the 11334 persons in the sample, 7217 (64%) continued in the panel through 
waves 1 to 6; on the other hand there is attrition amounting to 4117 (36%) persons who 
                                                                                                                                                        
processing requirements. In view of their small number, and the resource cost associated with 
inclusion, they have been omitted from the sample design. 
either refused interview or could not be contacted in one or more waves. If the attriting 
sample are a ‘random draw’ from the wave 1 sample frame they do not pose a serious 
concern for the empirical analysis, as the sample will remain representative of the 
population. However, we find that persons particularly prone to attrition were marginally 
younger, lived in cities, single, indigenous and not working when the data collection 
began. Those less prone to attrition were female, Australian-born, employed and living 
with a partner at the onset of the panel study. These differences are generally small, but 
nevertheless statistically significant at the 1 or 5% level.6 While these findings are cause 
for concern, these worries are allayed if the chances of attrition are unrelated to housing 
affordability status. We examine whether attrition rates are significantly different when 
calculated for housing consumers in HAS (as measured by net housing costs in excess of 
30% of income in the first wave they are observed to be independent) and housing 
consumers occupying affordable housing (paying 30% or less income to meet net housing 
costs in the first wave they are observed to be independent). The attrition rate is 36.1% for 
the former and 38.7% for the latter group. The difference in attrition rates is not 
statistically significant (sig. level = 0.141), a finding that is reassuring.7 
Missing values can also be a serious problem in panel data. Designing a panel 
where all persons must have a complete set of records in waves 1-6 for all variables can 
result in a considerable drop in sample size. We utilise information in the data base to 
impute a value for a variable in the wave(s) when it is missing. In the case of all variables, 
                                                     
6 The most notable difference is singles – they make up 22.1% of the sample interviewed in all 6 
waves, but a larger 27.2% of the sample that refuse interview or cannot be traced in one or more waves. 
7 We also conducted descriptive analyses using two samples drawn from the first 4 waves of data – a 
sample that includes those persons that subsequently refuse interview, or cannot be tracked down – and 
a second sample that excludes these persons. Our findings are generally unaffected when alternatively 
including and omitting the wave 5 and 6 attriting persons, lending some credence to the view that 
attrition is unlikely to bias our findings (see Wood and Ong, 2009 for details). 
missing values affect less than 10% of individuals in the person-period dataset.8 For 
details, refer to appendix A1.  
 
Measurement of Housing Costs and Housing Affordability 
Housing costs are measured on a tenure specific basis. Owner purchasers’ housing costs 
are mortgage repayments. Outright owners are assumed to have zero housing costs. 
Though home owners incur other housing related costs such as water rates, property taxes 
and maintenance expenditure, they cannot be included in our housing cost calculations 
because they are not elicited in all six waves of HILDA. Private renters’ housing costs are 
measured as rent net of CRA. Public renters’ housing costs are estimates of rebated rents. 
The rent-free typically have zero housing costs. But some are living in employer-provided 
housing as part of their job compensation and Engeland et al (2008) make the valid point 
that those receiving rent-free accommodation from employers may receive lower wages 
than would otherwise be the case. If valid, the person ‘pays’ a rent in foregone earnings. 
Hence, we estimate wage equations for males and females in each wave using model 
specifications that include a rent-free dummy that equals one if housing is part of job 
compensation, zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient is used to compute person-
specific effective housing costs. The wage equation has a log linear specification. Our 
results indicate that the rent ‘paid’ in foregone earnings can be large for those living in 
employer-provided housing, ranging from 19% to 39% of earnings.9 
The income measure employed is equivalised disposable income. Income is 
equivalised using the OECD equivalence scale (1982), where a weight of 1 is assigned to 
the first adult member of the income unit, 0.7 to the second adult member, and 0.5 to each 
                                                     
8 For example, at one extreme only 38 (2%) private renters do not report their rent payments in one or 
more waves. On the other hand, 724 (10%) owner purchasers fail to report their mortgage repayments 
in one or more waves.  
9 More details on the coefficient estimates and the number and percentage of the employed living in 
rent-free employer provided housing is available from the authors upon request. 
dependent child. The HAR is the ratio of net housing costs to equivalised disposable 
income.10 A person is in HAS if HARs exceed 30%. 
Cross-section studies typically define a household as being in housing stress when 
housing costs exceed 30% of income and the household is in the bottom 40% of the 
income distribution (Landt and Bray, 1997 and the cross-section analysis in Yates and 
Gabriel, 2006 for example). However, in longitudinal analysis (Yates and Gabriel, 2006; 
Marks and Sedgwick, 2008 and Engeland et al 2008), households are usually defined as 
being in housing stress when housing costs exceed 30% of income, regardless of 
household income. This is because the composition of households in the bottom 40% of 
the income distribution changes over time as households move up and down the income 
distribution. Income mobility figures from the HILDA data confirm that there has been 
considerable mobility across the income distribution over the period 2001–06. Of those in 
the bottom 40% in 2001, around 20–25% were in higher income quintiles in subsequent 
waves. Similarly, of those who were in the top three quintiles in 2001, 13% had moved 
into the bottom two quintiles by 2002 and 19% had descended into these bottom two 
quintiles by 2006. Clearly, with such income mobility difficulties will arise if restricting 
the definition of stressed status to low-income persons in some reference year.  
To be consistent with other longitudinal studies, we have defined a person as 
being in housing stress when the person’s income unit housing costs exceed 30% of 
income regardless of position in the income distribution. However, given considerable 
mobility across the income distribution, we have also re-estimated the hazard models 
under an alternative definition of housing stress, where a spell in HAS only begins if a 
person is observed to have housing costs in excess of 30% of income and is in the bottom 
40% of the income distribution. Such a spell ends if a person’s housing costs fall below 
                                                     
10 Net HARs subtract housing assistance from gross housing costs rather than being added to income. 
We invoke this approach because CRA is a price subsidy – the entitlement is a function of the rent paid 
and hence the amount of housing consumed. 
30% of income, but it also terminates if a person moves out of the bottom 40% of the 
income distribution.   
The two main forms of housing assistance in Australia are CRA for private 
renters and public housing rent rebates. CRA entitlements are not reported separately in 
HILDA. While public housing tenants do report their rents in the HILDA data, their 
reported rents do not always reflect their rebate entitlements, due to lags in the reporting 
of income changes to state housing authorities. Both forms of housing assistance are 
computed using the tax-benefit module of AHURI-3M, a housing market microsimulation 
model. The tax-benefit module uses the reported private incomes (from earnings, interest, 
dividends and so on) of HILDA survey respondents to calculate eligibility and 
entitlements to income support programs, including housing assistance and tax liabilities 
under personal income tax arrangements in each year from 2001 to 2006. This enables 
researchers to estimate the consequences for housing affordability of changes to housing 
assistance parameters for renters over the period 2001-06  (Wood and Ong, 2008). The 
take up rate of public housing rent rebates and CRA is assumed to be 100%. All public 
renters receive rent rebates because they are delivered in the form of income related rents. 
CRA is integrated into the income support payment program which facilitates a higher 
take up than if it were administered separately. 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics – A Hazard Rate Approach 
To address the issue of persistence, we take a hazard rate approach. The estimates 
are based on a sample of persons that have at least 1 year of HAS in the time frame 2001-
06, and measures the proportion who escape their spell of HAS in each subsequent year, 
given HAS in the previous year. The lower is the hazard rate profile the more persistent is 
HAS. A steep fall in the hazard rate suggests that while many quickly ‘escape’ HAS, 
there is negative duration dependence among those remaining in HAS beyond the first 
year. We also examine those ‘at risk’ of tumbling into HAS by selecting persons with at 
least one year residing in affordable housing over the period 2001-06. We then compute 
the proportion of persons that ‘survive’ in affordable housing in each subsequent year 
given occupation of affordable housing in the previous year. The higher is the survival 
rate profile the lower is the risk of falling into HAS. A convex survival curve implies that 
the risk of falling into HAS falls as spells lengthen and suggests that residence in 
affordable housing offers increasing protection against HAS. These research exercises use 
the first experience of a housing affordability status and analyse the persistence of that 
status. They ignore subsequent transitions across housing affordability states.11 Our 
sample comprises 7206 persons. In total these persons experience 1550 (first) spells of 
HAS and 7166 (first) spells of affordable housing within the data collection period.  
Table 2 is a ‘life table’ that tracks the event histories of ‘stressed’ individuals 
from the first year of their spell of HAS, through to the end of the data collection period 
(wave 6). We define the beginning of time as the first wave during which a person is 
recorded in HAS; interest focuses on whether, and if so, when the spell of HAS ends. At 
the beginning of time, year 0, all 1550 persons are in HAS and 172 persons’ spells are 
censored in year 0 because year 0 of their spell occurred in wave 6. This leaves 1378 
(1550-172) to enter the next time interval, that is, year 1. By the start of year 5 there are 
only 47 persons left in the risk set, and censoring at 37 exacts a heavy toll, only 10 
escaping during that year. The hazard rate is the key measure of the likelihood of 
escaping HAS in each time period. It is the conditional probability that a person will 
escape HAS given that he or she did not escape in an earlier time period. We learn from 
Table 2 that a majority of those in HAS during year 0 are likely to exit HAS during year 1 
– the hazard is 0.66. There is then a sharp decline in the hazard to 0.43 in year 2 that is 
                                                     
11 Subsequent transitions offer important insights into the permanence of escapes from HAS, or the 
transience of tumbles into HAS. Investigations into churning are outside the scope of this paper, but see 
Wood and Ong (2009) for some findings and suggestions for further research. 
followed by further modest declines to 0.21 in year 5. In sum, those starting a spell of 
HAS between 2001 and 2006 have a high chance of escaping HAS by year 1, but there is 
negative duration dependence. Nevertheless, as the survival rate profile indicates, the vast 




Figure 1 compares hazard rates by tenure; the hazards of owner purchasers and 
private renters are both high in year 1. But after year 2, an owner purchaser still in HAS 
finds it more difficult to escape as compared to their private rental counterparts. Since 
moving costs are generally lower for renters they are better placed to make adjustments 
by moving into cheaper accommodation, reducing housing costs burdens and thereby 
avoiding HAS. Evidence on moves confirms this hypothesis. In each year a much higher 
proportion of ‘stressed’ private renters move; for example, in 2001 38% (4%) of stressed 
private renters (owner purchasers) moved to other housing in the same tenure. In 2005 the 
proportions are 29% and 6% of stressed private renters and owner purchasers 
respectively. Between 2001 and 2006 nearly two-thirds (70%) of stressed private renters 
(owner purchasers) who made intra-tenure moves moved to cheaper rental (owner-
occupied) housing during their first spell of HAS.  
Figure 2 explores the risks faced by different household types and indicates that 
the presence of children is associated with more protracted first spells in HAS. Over 80% 
of couples without dependent children have escaped HAS by year 1, and by year 4 they 
have all escaped. But just under 60% of couples with children escape HAS by year 1, and 






We now turn our attention to spells in affordable housing and the risk of falling 
into HAS. Table 3 analyses the first spells of 7166 Australians that ‘survive’ at least one 
year in affordable housing between 2001 and 2006. Only 4.7% of the at risk group plunge 
into HAS in year 1, and so the survival rate is very high at 95.3%. In fact the survival rate 
remains very high; by year 5 the probability that an individual survives in affordable 
housing is 82%. The length of a spell in affordable housing seems to offer a protective 
effect such that the chances of tumbling into unaffordable housing circumstances become 
progressively smaller as spells lengthen. 
 
Table 3  
 
The spells in affordable housing represent a much larger sample of Australians, 
and so analysis of survivor functions by sub-groups is more convincing than that of spells 
in HAS. Figures 3 and 4 confirm the importance of tenure and children. Owner purchasers 
and couples with children are considerable less likely to survive in affordable housing. 
These are Australians typically in the early stages of labour and housing market careers, 
grappling with the pressing spending needs caused by children and the imperatives of 
finding suitable housing at a time when house prices were booming and interest rates 
climbing. Most of those dropping out of affordable housing are owner purchasers – they 
account for 59.5% of those who fail to survive in affordable housing; only 25.4% are 
renters. The owner purchasers that drop out of affordable housing have mean LVRs that 
are 54.6% in the last year of their spell. This is much higher than a mean LVR of 32.8% 






5. Modelling (Un-) Affordable Housing Spells  
In this section we add to the evidence base by modelling spells data as a function 
of key housing and labour market variables, controlling for the confounding influence of 
various socio-economic and demographic variables. The models are estimated using the 
at risk data set with respect to first spells. An essential feature of the risk set’s definition 
is that once an individual experiences the event (or is censored) he or she drops out of the 
risk set in all future periods.  
In modelling first spells in HAS, the target event is escape from HAS; in 
modelling first spells in affordable housing, the target event is falling out of affordable 
housing. The hazard (h) for person i in discrete time period j is the probability that s/he 
will experience the target event T in time period j conditional on the event not having 
occurred before time period j and his/her values for the P predictors in time period j 
(Singer and Willet, 2003): 
h(tij) = Pr[Ti = j|Ti≥j and X1ij = x1ij, X2ij = x2ij, …, XPij = xPij,  ]  (1) 
Equation (1) can be expressed as a logit (log of odds) function: 
logit h(tij) = [α1D1ij +α2D2ij +… αJDJij] + [β1X1ij +β2X2ij +… βPXPij]   (2)   
The explanatory variables are of two kinds, time indicators (D) and predictors (X). 
Both sets of variables are assumed to be exogenous, an assumption that is perhaps more 
plausible with respect to the time-invariant variables measured at the start of a spell, 
which cannot be simultaneously determined by future movements in and out of HAS. 
Time indicators index the discrete time periods that comprise a spell of (un-) affordable 
housing. If the maximum possible duration of a spell is five years, there are five 
indicators ( ) 1,5,4,3,2,1 == jj DwherejD if the person’s record belongs to time interval 
j, zero otherwise.12 The coefficient estimates (αj) represent the baseline hazard function.  
Predictor variables are measures of the factors that should be influential in 
shaping the probability of escaping HAS (or sustaining spells in affordable housing). 
These include housing market variables such as housing tenure, region and mobility; 
labour market and human capital variables such as educational qualifications, 
employment status and job contract type; socio-demographic variables such as age, 
ethnicity, marital status and number of dependent children. Our chosen model 
specification also recognises that time has an historical dimension; a 2 year spell of HAS 
covering 2002-2003 may have a different hazard profile as compared to one covering 
2003-2004, because unmeasured housing and labour market conditions could change. 
This hypothesis can be tested by inclusion of a vector of calendar year dummy variables 
as predictors. The predictor variables can be time-invariant or time-varying. For example, 
country of birth is necessarily a constant and therefore time-invariant. Time varying 
variables can take different values in each year. In some cases – age, for example – the 
variable will always change value. Though housing tenure is time-varying, we have 
chosen to measure the variable in a time invariant way – it is tenure in the first year of a 
spell. This is because we wish to judge whether a spell that originates in a particular 
tenure is more or less permanent than spells that originate in other tenures.  
The coefficient estimates (βk) can be transformed to obtain the increments in 
hazard rates (conditional probabilities) in every time period, controlling for the other 
predictors in the model. It is common and more intuitively appealing to transform the βk 
estimates into odds ratios. When the predictor variable is dichotomous - for example a 
                                                     
12 The panel extends over the timeframe 2001-06 but transitions occur from 2002 onwards, leaving a 
maximum length of spell of 5 years. 
variable such as moved that indicates whether the individual moved in any year j of a 
spell – the odds ratio is a measure of how likely movers are to exit from HAS (for 
instance) relative to non-movers. If the odds ratio is 2 movers are twice as likely to exit 
HAS at any given stage in a spell of un-affordable housing. A variable with an odds ratio 
greater (less) than one is then relatively more (less) likely to escape HAS.  
We conduct our modelling using two alternative definitions. In the first instance, 
a person is defined to be in HAS if housing costs exceed 30% of income. Then models are 
re-run with a person in HAS if housing costs exceed 30% of income and also positioned 
in the bottom 40% of the income distribution. As conclusions are largely unaffected by 
the choice of definition, we report detailed findings based on the first definition only.13 
Table 4 presents estimates for a discrete time hazard model of first spells in HAS. 
The model is statistically significant at the 1% level based on the Chi-square statistic. The 
benchmark for measurement of odds ratios is the omitted (default) categories (see note to 
table 4). The estimated odds ratios with respect to time indicators have a somewhat 
different interpretation. The odds ratio with respect to the first year of a spell is the 
(conditional) odds of exiting HAS in the first year, relative to the (conditional) odds of 
exiting at any point in the remaining years (second to the fifth) of a spell. The 
(conditional) odds of exiting HAS in the first year of a spell are 2.8 times higher than the 
(conditional) odds of exiting during the remaining years of a spell, and this estimate is 
statistically significant at 1%. The odds ratio remains relatively high in year 2, but then 
dips below 1, and is as low as 0.51 in the 5th year of a spell. This negative duration 
dependence is qualified by the observation that time indicators other than year 1 are 
statistically insignificant. The calendar year variables are mostly insignificant, the 
exception being 2004 where the (conditional) odds ratio is 1.5. 
                                                     
13 Results based on the second definition are shown in Appendix A2. 
Findings on housing market variables suggest that tenure has no impact on the 
chances of escaping HAS, contrary to the descriptive analyses which indicated that 
private renters have a higher hazard (see Figure 1). This could be because private renters 
in HAS are more likely to move. Indeed movers have odds of exiting HAS that are 2.5 
times the odds of ‘stayers’. Residential mobility is the second most important variable as 
measured by the odds ratio. It would seem that many spells in unaffordable housing are 
terminated by households trading down to cheaper housing. The higher transaction costs 
of owners deter mobility in this tenure and so adjustment of housing demand to 
accommodate housing cost pressures is more feasible in private rental housing.14 These 
findings and their interpretation are subject to the caveat that housing tenure and mobility 
are interrelated and hence endogenous.15 
Those employed full time on permanent contracts have odds 34% higher than 
those not in the labour force (NILF). Surprisingly those employed full time but on casual 
contracts are even more likely to exit HAS. The unemployed and most forms of 
employment status have odds ratios that are statistically insignificant. Small sample 
numbers in some of these employment categories could be responsible for statistically 
insignificant coefficients. If we merge the employment categories into a dichotomous 
employment variable it is statistically significant at the 5% level, with the odds ratio of 
1.338 indicating that employed persons are 34% more likely to escape HAS than those 
not working. If the employment variable is disaggregated on a full-time/part-time basis, 
                                                     
14 As stated previously, the model findings are largely unchanged when we restrict HAS status to those 
whose housing costs exceed 30% of income and are in the bottom 40% of the income distribution. For 
example, under both HAS definitions, findings on housing market variables suggest that tenure has no 
impact on the chances of escaping HAS while those who move are more than twice as likely to escape 
HAS as compared to stayers. 
15 The correlation coefficient between the homeowner (private renter) and residential mobility variable 
is -0.301 (0.308) and this is significant at the 1% level. The homeowner variable is defined as a binary 
variable that equals one if a person is an outright owner or owner purchaser, and zero if a person is in 
any tenure other than homeownership. Similarly, the private renter variable is a binary variable that 
equals one if a person is renting privately, and zero if the person is in any other tenure 
(homeownership, public renting and rent-free). 
only the full-time employed variable remains significant at the 5% level, with full-time 
workers having odds 35% higher than those not working.  
Among the socio-demographic controls, presence of dependent children is 
particularly important, and this is most evident when dependent children are aged 0-4 
years. Housing stressed Australians with very young children have odds of escaping HAS 
that are 40% lower than the odds of Australians with no dependent children. This is 
typically a period in the life course when households experience acute spending needs; 
the majority (86.6%) of those with dependent children at the start of the spell were owner 
purchasers during the first year of their spells, and among these owner purchasers 55% 
have withdrawn equity by adding to their mortgages on one or more occasions during 
their spell of HAS. It would seem that large numbers of stressed owner purchasers with 
dependent children have been encouraged by booming house prices and mortgage 
innovation to release housing equity to meet the expenses accompanying a growing 
family. But as a consequence they have reduced chances of escaping HAS (see Parkinson 





Table 5 presents coefficient estimates and odds ratios where the hazard is now the 
conditional probability of making a transition into HAS (unaffordable housing). The 
model is again statistically significant at the 1% level based on the Chi-square statistic. 
The time indicator odds ratios show that slipping into HAS becomes less likely the longer 
a spell has lasted, which confirms the idea that spells have a protective effect as they 
lengthen. The duration of spells in affordable housing is clearly affected by calendar year 
effects; there is a strong indication that as house prices, rents and interest rates increased 
over the 2002-2006 period, the chances of survival diminished. By 2006 the odds of 
dropping out of affordable housing are nearly 5 times the odds in 2002.  
Housing market variables are very important. At any given point in a spell, owner 
purchasers are more exposed to the risk of HAS than private renters and these tenants are 
in turn more exposed to the risk of HAS, than either those living in rent-free 
accommodation, or public housing tenants. The moved variable plays a different role to 
that in relation to spells in HAS. Survival in affordable housing is – at any given stage in 
the spell – less likely if the person has moved. It seems that if a move occurs during a 
spell in affordable housing it is generally to more expensive rather than cheaper housing. 
Since mobility and private renting are more strongly correlated it would appear that 
owner purchasers more precarious affordability status is not due their greater propensity 
to trade up through housing moves.16  
Labour market and human capital variables are influential in shaping the duration 
of spells in affordable housing. The employed have a better chance of surviving in 
affordable housing as compared to the NILF. On the other hand the odds ratio estimate 
indicates that the  odds of the unemployed falling into unaffordable housing are nearly 1.8 
                                                     
16 The correlation coefficient between the homeowner (private renter) and residential mobility variable 
in table 5 is only -0.070 (0.280) though this is significant at the 1% level.  
times those of the NILF. Our human capital variables require careful interpretation. They 
suggest that better qualified Australians’ spells of affordable housing are more precarious 
than those of Australians that had left school by year 11. We are probably picking up 
permanent income factors; those with high levels of human capital can expect rising (real) 
earnings profiles that prompt a correspondingly high demand for housing, and encourage 
the leveraged purchase of housing. 
The socio-demographic coefficient estimates confirm the importance of 
dependent children, particularly the very young. This is a sub-group of the Australian 
population that are more likely to fall into unaffordable housing circumstances. Despite 
economies of scale in housing consumption, the married have lower chances of survival 
in affordable housing than the single – regardless of the latter’s previous marital history. 
Age is also a factor; the young are more likely to make transitions into HAS. We could be 
picking up a labour market related impact here as age and work experience are correlated 
and experience attracts an earnings premium. Finally, migrants from non-English 




6. Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
Our panel analyses of housing consumers in HAS between 2001 and 2006 
demonstrates that a majority escape within a year, and most Australians that begin a spell 
in affordable housing are able to sustain it over five or more years. However, there is a 
‘hard core’ - albeit small in number - for whom HAS is a more protracted feature of their 
lives. There is then a polarised set of housing circumstances; on the one hand there is the 
majority of Australians that can sustain affordable housing, and a minority segment for 
whom unaffordable housing circumstances are a long term experience. 
The presence of children, employment and moves are particularly important 
factors influencing the chances of escaping HAS. Those that have no earnings – because 
they are non-participants in the labour force or unemployed – are more prone to persistent 
HAS. But earnings related variables such as qualifications have a subtle and perhaps 
unexpected role; because people consider their long term earnings prospects before 
entering longer term spending commitments such as housing, younger better qualified 
Australians’ have a higher chance of HAS. But this is a group who are likely to 
experience these difficulties on a transient basis, whereas the unemployed and non-
participants are more likely to make up the hard core that suffer protracted spells of HAS. 
Residential moves during spells in HAS tend to alleviate housing cost burdens. Renters 
are much more likely to move and hence they have better chances of escaping HAS than 
home buyers who tend to be less mobile, probably due to higher transactions costs. 
Survival in affordable housing has become progressively more difficult over the 
2001-06 timeframe, a finding that is perhaps unsurprising given a housing price boom and 
rising interest rates. But even taking these trends into account owner purchasers are less 
likely to survive in affordable housing. Residential moves are again influential, but those 
made by households during a spell living in affordable housing are associated with the 
onset of HAS. Thus moves initiated during a spell of affordable housing tend to involve 
trading up in the housing market, a pattern that is the opposite of moves initiated during 
spells living in unaffordable housing. Earnings from employment are important to 
securing survival in affordable housing, as expected, but the better qualified are found to 
be in more precarious housing affordability circumstances as they may bank on future 
increases in wages and salaries to leverage purchases. These precarious housing 
affordability circumstances are particularly evident among younger couples with 
dependent children, a stage in the life cycle that is associated with pressing spending 
needs. 
A limitation of the analysis is that only first spells of HAS are examined. If 
churning in and out of HAS is common in the time period 2001-06, the statistical patterns 
revealed by an analysis of first spells may not be apparent when repeat spells are 
included. It turns out that among those suffering at least one spell of HAS, more than 1 in 
5 (22%) had two or three spells. There is then a considerable amount of churning; it is a 
topic deserving of attention from researchers.  
The conclusions presented in this paper could be reversed in weaker economic 
conditions where expectations of growing earnings prove to be optimistic. There is a 
suggestion in the findings that young Australian couples are trading in house price gains 
and banking on future growth in earnings and house prices to ‘see them through’ in the 
medium to long term. It now looks as if home owners will face a prolonged period of 
stagnant house prices, and a rapidly deteriorating labour market would leave some of 
these couples with reduced incomes, but owing large amounts on their mortgages. An 
important future research direction is to conduct a similar analysis using future waves of 
the HILDA Survey that will cover a period characterised by weaker housing market 
conditions. Another important question for future research is whether stressed Australians 
are accommodating housing cost burdens by trading down into housing of low standards 
and inferior location given household type and size. Crippling housing cost burdens that 
displace the unemployed or non-participant into weak labour market regions could 
exacerbate labour market problems. 
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Appendix A1: The Treatment of Missing Values  
A careful examination of the variables that we employ in analyses of housing 
affordability reveals that there are no missing values for the following variables: 
• Age  
• Gender  
• Income unit type  
• Number of dependent children  
• Country of birth  
• Location  
• Labour force status 
• Highest educational qualification 
• English proficiency 
• Whether moved since last wave 
The simplest approach to address the missing values problem is to assume that 
variable values are unchanged from wave to wave so that when a variable is recorded in 
(say) wave 1, but not in wave 2, the former value is used as the estimate for wave 2. This 
procedure is clearly less appropriate for variables whose values are volatile – house 
prices, for example.  
For certain key variables (e.g. market rent, earnings) that vary from year to year we 
have developed regression models that can be used to impute values. In the case of 
earnings, model specifications have been designed that include the human capital and 
other socio-economic variables typical of earnings functions. In the case of market rent, 
hedonic rent regressions have been designed that include property and personal 
characteristics. The models ‘fit’ the data quite well; the predicted values from such 
regression models are then a reasonably reliable imputed value. 17  
                                                     
17 Model estimates are available from authors upon request. 
There are some variables that are time indexed, e.g. age and labour market history, 
where we can compute their missing values from values in earlier (or later) waves. In the 
case of age this is straightforward. Some variables are also related to other variables in 
unambiguous ways. Consider death of a parent by age 14, a variable that we have used in 
other research to measure intergenerational transmission of disadvantage. There are 
refusals to reveal this information. But elsewhere in the survey, respondents are asked if 
their parents were employed when they themselves were youngsters (age 14 years). 
Parent employment status can then be used to rule out death of parents by this stage in 
their offspring’s life course.  
There are variables like disposable income that we construct ourselves using the 
AHURI-3M tax-benefit simulator. The method involves use of reported private sources of 
income and application of Australian Taxation Office tax provisions and Centrelink 
eligibility and entitlement criteria to compute tax liabilities and income support payments. 
But if private sources of income are missing these methods cannot be applied. However, 
there are HILDA generated variables, such as imputed disposable income, that can be 
used as alternative measures. In cases where none of the options resolve the missing 
values problem for variable x, these cases are omitted from the sample in the descriptive 
and modelling sections wherever the variable x is required for analysis.  
Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Composition of the Sample (Persons in Responding Income Units Only)a 
 Number of persons 
Independents in wave 1: 
   In private non-group households in all waves 
10705 
   In private group households in all waves 1822 
   In non-group households in non-private dwellings in at least one wave 65 
   In group households in non-private dwellings in at least one wave 20 
Dependents in wave 1 that become independents  1136 
Sub-total 13748 
Excluding:b  
   Boarders, residents of non-private dwellings and persons in unidentified  
   tenures in at least one wave  
1169 
   Independents in wave j who become dependents in wave j+i 272 
   Persons with non-positive gross or disposable income unit incomes in at  
   least one wave 
1520 
Total sample 11334 
Source: Authors’ calculations using confidentialised unit record files of the HILDA Survey waves 1-6 
Notes: 
a. For couples, responding income units are income units in which both the reference person and 
partner have agreed to be interviewed. 
b. Groups are not mutually exclusive e.g. a boarder could also have non-positive incomes 
 
Table 2: Rates of ‘Escape’ from a First Spell of HAS 
Yeara 
(t) 
Number Hazard rate 
Ht = Nt / Tt c 
Survival rate 
St = St-1(1-Ht) c 
 In HAS at start of 
year (T) 
Escaped HAS during 
the year (N) 
Censoredb at 
end of year 
  
0 1550 0 172  1.000 
1 1378 907 74 0.658 0.342 
2 397 172 30 0.433 0.194 
3 195 73 22 0.374 0.121 
4 100 31 22 0.310 0.084 
5 47 10 37 0.213 0.066 
Source: Authors’ calculations using confidentialised unit record files of the HILDA Survey waves 1-6 
Notes: 
a. Housing costs and income are measured only once per year. The wave when a person is first 
recorded in HAS is then labelled year 0 because the person cannot leave HAS until the following wave, 
which is then labelled year 1.  
b. Censored means that year t+1 occurred after the end of the data collection period. For example, a 
first spell of HAS that begins in wave 6 will inevitably be censored at the end of year 0 because wave 6 
is the last wave of data collection. 
c. Tt is the number of persons in HAS at the start of year t, Nt is the number of persons who escaped 
HAS during year t, Ht is the hazard rate in year t, St is the survival rate in year t, St-1 is the survival rate 









Figure 1: All Individuals ‘At Risk’ of Escaping a First Spell of HAS, by Housing Tenure in First 





















All Owner purchaser Private renter
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using confidentialised unit record files of the HILDA Survey waves 1-6 
Note:  
a. The ‘All’category refers to all first spells in HAS, including spells in HAS by public renters and rent-
free persons.  
 
 
Figure 2: All Individuals ‘At Risk’ of Escaping a First Spell of HAS, by Income Unit Type in 
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Table 3: The Duration of First Spells in Affordable Housing 
Yeara 
(t) 
Number Hazard rate 
Ht = Nt / Tt c 
Survival rate 
St = St-1(1-Ht) d 
 In affordable housing 
during year (T) 
Fell into HAS 
during the year (N) 
Censoredb at 
end of year 
  
0 7166 0 34  1.000 
1 7132 333 48 0.047 0.953 
2 6751 312 62 0.046 0.909 
3 6377 234 71 0.037 0.876 
4 6072 228 192 0.038 0.843 
5 5652 166 5486 0.029 0.818 
Source: Authors’ calculations using confidentialised unit record files of the HILDA Survey waves 1-6 
Notes: 
a. Housing costs and income are measured only once per year. The wave when a person is first 
recorded in affordable housing is then labelled year 0 because the person cannot fall out of affordable 
housing until the following wave, which is then labelled year 1.  
b. Censored means that year t+1 occurred after the end of the data collection period. For example, a 
first spell of residence in affordable housing that begins in wave 6 will inevitably be censored at the 
end of year 0 because wave 6 is the last wave of data collection. 
c. Tt is the number of persons in HAS at the start of year t, Nt is the number of persons who escaped 
HAS during year t, Ht is the hazard rate in year t, St is the survival rate in year t, St-1 is the survival rate 
in year preceding t.  
 
 
















All Owner purchaser Private renter Public renter
 



































All Couple with dependents
Couple without dependents Sole parents
Single
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using confidentialised unit record files of the HILDA Survey waves 1-6 
 
Table 4: Discrete Hazard Model Estimates – Hazard with Respect to First Spell of HASa 
Explanatory variables Coefficient  Odds ratio 
First year of spell 1.016 ** 2.762 
Second year of spell 0.249  1.282 
Third year of spell -0.110  0.896 
Fourth year of spell -0.298  0.743 
Fifth year of spell -0.680  0.507 
2003 0.274  1.315 
2004 0.423 ** 1.527 
2005 0.203  1.225 
2006 0.254  1.289 
Private renter 0.059  1.061 
Public renter or rent-free 0.445  1.560 
Moved 0.926 ** 2.525 
Inner region 0.311 * 1.364 
Outer region 0.290  1.336 
Age -0.004  0.996 
Born in main English-speaking countries 0.050  1.052 
Born in non-main English-speaking countries -0.416 ** 0.660 
Disabled 0.214  1.239 
Defactob 0.055  1.056 
Divorced, separated or widowed -0.163  0.850 
Single never married 0.394  1.482 
Number of dependent children age 0-4 years -0.581 ** 0.560 
Number of dependent children age 5-9 years -0.311 ** 0.732 
Number of dependent children age 10-14 years -0.265 ** 0.767 
Number of dependent children age 15-24 years -0.436 ** 0.647 
High-level qualifications -0.073  0.930 
Medium-level qualifications -0.058  0.943 
Full-time permanent contract 0.290 * 1.336 
Explanatory variables Coefficient  Odds ratio 
Full-time fixed-term contract 0.444  1.559 
Part-time permanent contract 0.141  1.152 
Part -time fixed-term contract 0.959  2.610 
Casual or other contract 0.577 ** 1.781 
Self-employed 0.110  1.116 
Unemployed -0.150  0.861 
Diagnostics    
Observations 2112   
Cox & Snell R-square 0.181   
Nagelkerke R-square 0.242   
Chi-square 422.808 **  
Source: Authors’ own estimates from confidentialised unit record files of the HILDA Survey waves 1-
6 
Notes:  
a. The default categories are year 2002, owner purchaser, major city, Australian-born, married, low-
level qualifications and not in the labour force. 
b. Defactos are partners that belong to unmarried cohabiting couples. 
** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 5% level 
 
  
Table 5: Discrete Hazard Model Estimates – Survival in First Spell of Affordable Housinga 
Explanatory variables Coefficient  Odds ratio 
First year of spell -4.371 ** 0.013 
Second year of spell -4.974 ** 0.007 
Third year of spell -5.437 ** 0.004 
Fourth year of spell -5.671 ** 0.003 
Fifth year of spell -5.839 ** 0.003 
2003 0.808 ** 2.243 
2004 1.141 ** 3.130 
2005 1.504 ** 4.497 
2006 1.545 ** 4.689 
Owner purchaser 2.100 ** 8.163 
Private renter 1.896 ** 6.657 
Public renter 1.133 ** 3.104 
Rent-free 1.840 ** 6.293 
Moved 0.678 ** 1.970 
Inner region -0.303 ** 0.738 
Outer region -0.487 ** 0.615 
Age -0.021 ** 0.980 
Australian-born and Indigenous -1.266 ** 0.282 
Born in main English-speaking countries 0.088  1.092 
Born in non-main English-speaking countries 0.369 ** 1.446 
Disabled -0.088  0.916 
Defacto -0.425 ** 0.654 
Divorced -0.595 ** 0.551 
Separated -0.441 * 0.643 
Widowed -0.492  0.612 
Single never married -0.962 ** 0.382 
Number of dependent children age 0-4 years 0.507 ** 1.661 
Explanatory variables Coefficient  Odds ratio 
Number of dependent children age 5-9 years 0.265 ** 1.303 
Number of dependent children age 10-14 years 0.330 ** 1.391 
Number of dependent children age 15-24 years 0.310 ** 1.364 
Postgraduate 0.449 ** 1.567 
Graduate 0.464 ** 1.591 
Bachelor 0.467 ** 1.594 
Advanced diploma / diploma 0.547 ** 1.728 
Certificate III or IV 0.285 ** 1.330 
Certificate I or II 0.473  1.605 
Certificate not defined 0.344  1.410 
Year 12 0.078  1.082 
Full-time permanent contract -0.519 ** 0.595 
Full-time fixed-term contract -0.641 ** 0.527 
Part-time permanent contract -0.561 ** 0.571 
Part -time fixed-term contract -0.694 * 0.500 
Casual or other contract -0.390 ** 0.677 
Self-employed 0.449 ** 1.567 
Unemployed 0.596 ** 1.815 
Diagnostics    
Observations 31930   
Cox & Snell R-square 0.671   
Nagelkerke R-square 0.895   
Chi-square 35530.186 **  
Source: Authors’ own estimates from confidentialised unit record files of the HILDA Survey waves 1-
6 
Notes: 
a. The default categories are year 2002, outright owner, major city, Australian-born and non-
Indigenous, married, below year 12 qualifications and not in the labour force. 
** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 5% level 
Appendix A2: Modelling Results under an Alternative Definition of 
HAS 
 
Table A1. Discrete hazard model estimates: hazard with respect to first spell of HASa 
Explanatory variables Coefficient  Odds ratio 
First year of spell 1.690 ** 5.420 
Second year of spell 0.679  1.971 
Third year of spell 0.871  2.390 
Fourth year of spell 0.588  1.801 
Fifth year of spell -1.002  0.367 
2003 0.415  1.515 
2004 0.475 * 1.609 
2005 0.695 ** 2.004 
2006 0.387  1.473 
Private renter -0.342  0.710 
Public renter or rent-free -0.267  0.765 
Moved 0.760 ** 2.138 
Inner region 0.196  1.216 
Outer region 0.010  1.010 
Age -0.009  0.991 
Born in main English-speaking countries 0.069  1.071 
Born in non-main English-speaking countries -0.384 * 0.681 
Disabled 0.061  1.063 
De facto 0.136  1.145 
Divorced, separated or widowed -0.525 * 0.592 
Single never married 0.111  1.117 
Number of dependent children aged 0–4 years -0.720 ** 0.487 
Number of dependent children aged 5–9 years -0.287 ** 0.750 
Number of dependent children aged 10–14 years -0.352 ** 0.703 
Explanatory variables Coefficient  Odds ratio 
Number of dependent children aged 15–24 years -0.230  0.795 
High-level qualifications 0.074  1.077 
Medium-level qualifications -0.058  0.944 
Full-time permanent contract 0.732 ** 2.080 
Full-time fixed-term contract 0.768  2.156 
Part-time permanent contract 0.456  1.577 
Part-time fixed-term contract 1.118  3.059 
Casual or other contract 1.098 ** 2.997 
Self-employed -0.043  0.958 
Unemployed -0.178  0.837 
Diagnostics     
Observations 1203    
Cox & Snell R-square 0.269    
Nagelkerke R-square 0.359    
Chi-square 377.280 **   
Notes: a The default categories are year 2002, owner purchaser, major city, Australian-born, married, 
low-level qualifications and not in the labour force. 
**Significant at the 1% level; *Significant at the 5% level. 
Source: Authors’ estimates from confidentialised unit record files of the HILDA Survey waves 1–6. 
 
Table A2. Discrete hazard model estimates: survival in first spell of affordable housinga 
Explanatory variables Coefficient  Odds ratio 
First year of spell -4.111 ** 0.016 
Second year of spell -4.978 ** 0.007 
Third year of spell -5.637 ** 0.004 
Fourth year of spell -5.479 ** 0.004 
Fifth year of spell -5.707 ** 0.003 
2003 1.090 ** 2.976 
2004 1.569 ** 4.800 
Explanatory variables Coefficient  Odds ratio 
2005 1.668 ** 5.302 
2006 1.601 ** 4.959 
Owner-purchaser 1.546 ** 4.693 
Private renter 1.230 ** 3.421 
Public renter 0.435  1.545 
Rent-free 0.809 ** 2.245 
Moved 0.542 ** 1.719 
Inner region -0.099  0.906 
Outer region -0.274 * 0.760 
Age -0.024 ** 0.976 
Australian-born and Indigenous -1.021 * 0.360 
Born in main English-speaking countries 0.109  1.115 
Born in non- English-speaking countries 0.520 ** 1.682 
Disabled -0.052  0.949 
De facto -0.021  0.979 
Divorced -0.312  0.732 
Separated 0.250  1.284 
Widowed -0.418  0.659 
Single never married -0.336 * 0.715 
Number of dependent children aged 0–4 years 0.584 ** 1.793 
Number of dependent children aged 5–9 years 0.290 ** 1.337 
Number of dependent children aged 10–14 years 0.337 ** 1.401 
Number of dependent children aged 15–24 years 0.261 ** 1.299 
Postgraduate -0.006  0.994 
Graduate 0.076  1.079 
Bachelor 0.241  1.272 
Advanced diploma / diploma 0.353 * 1.423 
Certificate III or IV 0.280 * 1.323 
Certificate I or II 0.495  1.640 
Explanatory variables Coefficient  Odds ratio 
Certificate not defined 0.081  1.084 
Year 12 0.095  1.100 
Full-time permanent contract -1.306 ** 0.271 
Full-time fixed-term contract -1.008 ** 0.365 
Part-time permanent contract -1.187 ** 0.305 
Part-time fixed-term contract -0.830 * 0.436 
Casual or other contract -0.683 ** 0.505 
Self-employed 0.276 * 1.318 
Unemployed 0.673 ** 1.959 
Diagnostics     
Observations 33357    
Cox & Snell R-square 0.699    
Nagelkerke R-square 0.932    
Chi-square 40070.576  **   
Notes: a The default categories are year 2002, outright owner, major city, Australian-born and non-
Indigenous, married, below year 12 qualifications and not in the labour force. 
**Significant at the 1% level; *Significant at the 5% level. 
Source: Authors’ estimates from confidentialised unit record files of the HILDA Survey waves 1–6. 
 
